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Reasons, Justification, and Defeat
Engelsk Hardback
Reasons, Justification, and Defeat
Engelsk Hardback

898 kr
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Om denne bog
Traditionally, the notion of defeat has been central to epistemology, practical reasoning, and ethics. Within epistemology, it is standardly assumed that a subject who knows that p, or justifiably believes that p, can lose this knowledge or justified belief by acquiring a so-called ''defeater'', whether that is evidence that not-p, evidence that the process that produced her belief is unreliable, or evidence that she has likely misevaluated her own evidence. Within ethics and practical reasoning, it is widely accepted that a subject may initially have a reason to do something although this reason is later defeated by her acquisition of further information. However, the traditional conception of defeat has recently come under attack. Some have argued that the notion of defeat is problematically motivated; others that defeat is hard to accommodate within externalist or naturalistic accounts of knowledge or justification; and still others that the intuitions that support defeat can be explained in other ways. This volume presents new work re-examining the very notion of defeat, and its place in epistemology and in normativity theory at large.
Product detaljer
Sprog:
Engelsk
Sider:
298
ISBN-13:
9780198847205
Indbinding:
Hardback
Udgave:
ISBN-10:
0198847203
Udg. Dato:
16 apr 2021
Længde:
23mm
Bredde:
161mm
Højde:
242mm
Forlag:
Oxford University Press
Oplagsdato:
16 apr 2021
Forfatter(e):
Kategori sammenhænge