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  3. Konstitution: regering og stat

Fixing Democracy

- Why Constitutional Change Often Fails to Enhance Democracy in Latin America
Af: Javier Corrales Engelsk Paperback

Fixing Democracy

- Why Constitutional Change Often Fails to Enhance Democracy in Latin America
Af: Javier Corrales Engelsk Paperback
Tjek vores konkurrenters priser
The study of institutions, a core concept in comparative politics, has produced many rich and influential theories on the economic and political effects of institutions, yet it has been less successful at theorizing their origins. In Fixing Democracy, Javier Corrales develops a theory of institutional origins that concentrates on constitutions and levels of power within them. He reviews numerous Latin American constituent assemblies and constitutional amendments to explore why some democracies expand rather than restrict presidential powers and why this heightened presidentialism discourages democracy. His signal theoretical contribution is his elaboration on power asymmetries. Corrales determines that conditions of reduced power asymmetry make constituent assemblies more likely to curtail presidential powers, while weaker opposition and heightened power asymmetry is an indicator that presidential powers will expand. The bargain-based theory that he uses focuses on power distribution and provides a more accurate variable in predicting actual constitutional outcomes than other approaches based on functionalism or ideology. While the empirical focus is Latin America, Fixing Democracy contributes a broadly applicable theory to the scholarship both institutions and democracy.
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The study of institutions, a core concept in comparative politics, has produced many rich and influential theories on the economic and political effects of institutions, yet it has been less successful at theorizing their origins. In Fixing Democracy, Javier Corrales develops a theory of institutional origins that concentrates on constitutions and levels of power within them. He reviews numerous Latin American constituent assemblies and constitutional amendments to explore why some democracies expand rather than restrict presidential powers and why this heightened presidentialism discourages democracy. His signal theoretical contribution is his elaboration on power asymmetries. Corrales determines that conditions of reduced power asymmetry make constituent assemblies more likely to curtail presidential powers, while weaker opposition and heightened power asymmetry is an indicator that presidential powers will expand. The bargain-based theory that he uses focuses on power distribution and provides a more accurate variable in predicting actual constitutional outcomes than other approaches based on functionalism or ideology. While the empirical focus is Latin America, Fixing Democracy contributes a broadly applicable theory to the scholarship both institutions and democracy.
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Produktdetaljer
Sprog: Engelsk
Sider: 288
ISBN-13: 9780190868901
Indbinding: Paperback
Udgave:
ISBN-10: 0190868902
Kategori: Konstitution: regering og stat
Udg. Dato: 12 jul 2018
Længde: 18mm
Bredde: 234mm
Højde: 157mm
Forlag: Oxford University Press Inc
Oplagsdato: 12 jul 2018
Forfatter(e): Javier Corrales
Forfatter(e) Javier Corrales

Kategori Konstitution: regering og stat

ISBN-13 9780190868901

Sprog Engelsk

Indbinding Paperback

Sider 288

Udgave

Længde 18mm

Bredde 234mm

Højde 157mm

Udg. Dato 12 jul 2018

Oplagsdato 12 jul 2018

Forlag Oxford University Press Inc