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Desire as Belief

- A Study of Desire, Motivation, and Rationality
Af: Alex Gregory Engelsk Hardback

Desire as Belief

- A Study of Desire, Motivation, and Rationality
Af: Alex Gregory Engelsk Hardback
Tjek vores konkurrenters priser
A popular model of human action treats it as universally explicable by appeal to what we want. A related view evaluates our actions as rational or otherwise by appeal to what we want. However, these dominant views sit in tension with two other common sense ideas. First, that our normative beliefs — such as our beliefs about what we ought to do — sometimes explain our actions. Second, that those beliefs are crucial for determining whether our actions are rational. To try and resolve these tensions, this book defends ''desire-as-belief'', the view that desires are just a special subset of our normative beliefs. This view entitles us to accept orthodox models of human motivation and rationality that explain those things with reference to desire, while also making room for our normative beliefs to play a role in those domains. This view also tells us to diverge from the orthodox view on which desires themselves can never be right or wrong. Rather, according to desire-as-belief, our desires can themselves be assessed for their accuracy, and they are wrong when they misrepresent normative features of the world. Hume says that it is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of your finger, but he is wrong: it is foolish to have this preference, and this is so because this preference misrepresents the relative worth of these things. This book mounts an engaging and comprehensive defence of these ideas.
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A popular model of human action treats it as universally explicable by appeal to what we want. A related view evaluates our actions as rational or otherwise by appeal to what we want. However, these dominant views sit in tension with two other common sense ideas. First, that our normative beliefs — such as our beliefs about what we ought to do — sometimes explain our actions. Second, that those beliefs are crucial for determining whether our actions are rational. To try and resolve these tensions, this book defends ''desire-as-belief'', the view that desires are just a special subset of our normative beliefs. This view entitles us to accept orthodox models of human motivation and rationality that explain those things with reference to desire, while also making room for our normative beliefs to play a role in those domains. This view also tells us to diverge from the orthodox view on which desires themselves can never be right or wrong. Rather, according to desire-as-belief, our desires can themselves be assessed for their accuracy, and they are wrong when they misrepresent normative features of the world. Hume says that it is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of your finger, but he is wrong: it is foolish to have this preference, and this is so because this preference misrepresents the relative worth of these things. This book mounts an engaging and comprehensive defence of these ideas.
Produktdetaljer
Sprog: Engelsk
Sider: 240
ISBN-13: 9780198848172
Indbinding: Hardback
Udgave:
ISBN-10: 019884817X
Udg. Dato: 30 jun 2021
Længde: 23mm
Bredde: 241mm
Højde: 160mm
Forlag: Oxford University Press
Oplagsdato: 30 jun 2021
Forfatter(e): Alex Gregory
Forfatter(e) Alex Gregory


Kategori Bevidsthedsfilosofi


ISBN-13 9780198848172


Sprog Engelsk


Indbinding Hardback


Sider 240


Udgave


Længde 23mm


Bredde 241mm


Højde 160mm


Udg. Dato 30 jun 2021


Oplagsdato 30 jun 2021


Forlag Oxford University Press

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