According to a fairly standard view, there are several reasons for denying that existence is a real property of individuals. One is that ''exists'' cannot be predicated of individuals, and another is that first-level properties are parasitic on individuals for their actuality, which is something that existence could never be. A third is that existence adds nothing to individuals. Moreover, even if existence were to survive all three counter-indications, it would be merely the most vacuous of properties. The Fullness of Being, however, argues that this view of existence is seriously awry. In this brilliant book, Barry Miller argues that existence is not merely a real property of individuals, but by far the richest of their properties.

The commonly accepted view of existence is testimony, contends Miller, to what happens when wrong questions are asked, false assumptions are made, and the possibility of a new paradigm for existence is dismissed without consideration. They bear witness to the substantial flaws underlying the familiar claim ''existence is not a predicate'' and the Frege-Russell-Quine view not only of ''exists'' as exclusively a second-level predicate, but of existence as no more than a Cambridge property of individuals.

By way of contrast, The Fullness of Being is an account of what happens when different questions are asked, when false assumptions are eschewed, and when the possibility of a radically different paradigm for existence is actively explored rather than completely ignored. What began for Miller as an exercise in philosophical logic to determine whether ''exists'' is predicable of individuals, ends in an argument with groundbreaking consequences for ontology.