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Anatomy of Mistrust

- U.S.-Soviet Relations during the Cold War
Af: Deborah Welch Larson Engelsk Hardback

Anatomy of Mistrust

- U.S.-Soviet Relations during the Cold War
Af: Deborah Welch Larson Engelsk Hardback
Tjek vores konkurrenters priser

The United States and the Soviet Union missed numerous diplomatic opportunities to resolve differences and control the arms race because neither state trusted the other, according to Deborah Welch Larson. In Anatomy of Mistrust, She shows that the goals of Soviet and U.S. leaders were frequently complementary, and an agreement should have been attainable. Lost opportunities contributed to bankruptcy for the Soviet Union, serious damage to the economy of the United States, decreased public support for internationalist policies, and a proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Synthesizing different understandings of trust and mistrust from the theoretical traditions of economics, psychology, and game theory, Larson analyzes five cases that might have been turning points in U.S.-Soviet relations: the two-year period following Stalin''s death in 1953; Khrushchev''s peace offensive from the launching of Sputnik until the U-2 incident; the Kennedy administration; the Nixon-Brezhnev detente; and the Gorbachev period. Larson concludes that leaders in the United States often refused to accept Soviet offers to negotiate because they feared a trap. Mutual trust is necessary, she concludes, although it may not be sufficient, for states to cooperate in managing their security.

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The United States and the Soviet Union missed numerous diplomatic opportunities to resolve differences and control the arms race because neither state trusted the other, according to Deborah Welch Larson. In Anatomy of Mistrust, She shows that the goals of Soviet and U.S. leaders were frequently complementary, and an agreement should have been attainable. Lost opportunities contributed to bankruptcy for the Soviet Union, serious damage to the economy of the United States, decreased public support for internationalist policies, and a proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Synthesizing different understandings of trust and mistrust from the theoretical traditions of economics, psychology, and game theory, Larson analyzes five cases that might have been turning points in U.S.-Soviet relations: the two-year period following Stalin''s death in 1953; Khrushchev''s peace offensive from the launching of Sputnik until the U-2 incident; the Kennedy administration; the Nixon-Brezhnev detente; and the Gorbachev period. Larson concludes that leaders in the United States often refused to accept Soviet offers to negotiate because they feared a trap. Mutual trust is necessary, she concludes, although it may not be sufficient, for states to cooperate in managing their security.

Produktdetaljer
Sprog: Engelsk
Sider: 352
ISBN-13: 9780801433023
Indbinding: Hardback
Udgave:
ISBN-10: 0801433029
Udg. Dato: 24 apr 1997
Længde: 28mm
Bredde: 155mm
Højde: 235mm
Forlag: Cornell University Press
Oplagsdato: 24 apr 1997
Forfatter(e): Deborah Welch Larson
Forfatter(e) Deborah Welch Larson


Kategori Konstitution: regering og stat


ISBN-13 9780801433023


Sprog Engelsk


Indbinding Hardback


Sider 352


Udgave


Længde 28mm


Bredde 155mm


Højde 235mm


Udg. Dato 24 apr 1997


Oplagsdato 24 apr 1997


Forlag Cornell University Press

Kategori sammenhænge